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Abstract 
 
By surveying the universal service policies in six Latin American countries, this study 
explores the evolution of the concept during the rollout of the telecommunication reform in the last 
decade. Country profiles and a set of universal service indicators provide a frame for discussing 
issues of accessibility and affordability of telephone service in the region. This study found that the 
reconfiguration of national networks fostered by liberalization policies offered risks and opportunities 
to achieve universal service goals. The diversification of access points and services enhanced users 
choices but price rebalancing and lack of Universal Service Obligations (USO) to target groups with 
special needs depressed the demand and threatened to exclude significant parts of the population. The 
situation requires the reformulation of USO incorporating all technological solutions existing in the 
market, and factors from the consumer-demand accounting for the urban-rural continuum, and 
different social and economic strata. This study identifies the emergence of a second generation of 
USO targeting some of these needs. However, more competition and special tariff plans for the poor 
need to be incorporated to the options available in the market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The term universal service, as first used in the AT&T slogan “one system, one policy, universal 
service,” was part of a corporate strategy aimed at undermining the position of multiple rival 
networks that served the United States in 1907. The AT&T strategy was to peddle the idea of 
consolidating independent telephone exchanges into local monopolies that could interconnect as 
many users as possible (Mueller, 1997). The benefits of a pervasive network that overcame the rather 
fragmented and disconnected scenario of previous years was an excellent showcase for this model. 
One result was that the achievement of universal service was subordinated to the existence of a 
monopoly for basic telephony for decades. The social dimension of the concept grew up along with 
spawning public telephone and telegraph monopolies (PTTs) that served countries in Europe, Africa, 
Asia and Latin America for more than 80 years. However, with the exception of the wealthiest 
nations, the rate of investment of PTTs was insufficient to meet the demand of telecommunication 
services in most nations. 
 Since the mid 1980s liberalization policies seeking to achieve industry efficiencies have emerged 
as an alternative path to attain the goal of universal service. These waves of liberalization struck Latin 
America with particular energy. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (2000) estimates 
that, between 1988 and 1998, more than two-thirds of the Latin American PTTs were partially or 
fully privatized. Animated by capital that by and large came from wealthier nations, basic telephone 
networks in the region have grown twice as fast as the telephone systems of developed countries. 
Despite this burst of capital and services, not much more than one-third of the region's households 
have a fixed phone (ITU, 2000:3). Achieving 100% service penetration is still a pending goal in 
developing nations that have pursued liberalization policies. The issue becomes even more urgent to 
address in light of the rapid growth of the Internet or computer-mediated communications (CMC) in 
developed nations, a situation that threatens to widen the gap between the First and the Third world.
 By reviewing the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, this study traces 
the evolution of the universal service policies designed and pursued during the first decade of liberal 
reforms. This study addresses broader questions of how different approaches to telecommunication 
reform are fostering higher levels of service penetration in developing countries, and what types of 
governance they have brought about.  The goal is to identify particular trends of telecommunication 
services penetration, and to draw lessons that help to improve the strategy of network development of 
these nations, most of which are currently engaged in a second round of legislative reforms. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Universal service: a concept in transformation 
 The basic conceptualization of universal service in the telecom business is commonly associated 
with the availability of telephone lines accessible to the public, in both economic and geographical 
terms. As Mueller puts it, it is “a telephone network that covers all of a country, is technologically 
integrated, and connects as many citizens as possible” (1997, p.1). This ambitious parameter calls for 
no distinctions between rural and urban areas, economic strata or social categories. 
 Universal service is pursued through diverse means that usually focus on the supply-side of 
telecommunication services. Universal Service Obligations’ (USO) strategies include:  
(1) Extending the service to unserved populations in inner city and rural areas. 
(2) Meeting unsatisfied demand for access lines targeting customers on waiting lists.  
(3) Making telecommunication services affordable for low-income citizens, commonly known as 
the ‘unphoned’. Strategies aiming at this goal go from the expansion of pay phone networks 
(public telephony) to tariff systems that benefit the poorest households. (Tyler, Letwin & 
Roe, 1995). 
 Focusing on infrastructure accessibility, or service affordability and reliability, universal service 
policies are key to assure network expansion beyond the limits established by free market dynamics. 
Despite the apparently clear definition and policy objectives, a technical description of what is 
“essential” in telecommunications has proven to be a complex and controversial topic. Technological 
convergence and blurring market barriers have altered the structure of the telecommunication 
business as well as traditional definitions of basic service. Teledensity or the number of fixed phone 
lines per hundred inhabitants, the index traditionally used to weigh the concept, is nowadays 
considered an “imperfect measure of universal service” (ITU, 1998b, p.20). Some have proposed 
instead to use household service penetration as an indicator to gauge universal service (Mueller, 1996; 
ITU, 1998b)1, since it indicates residential use. However, neither of these indices reflects the direction 
and segmentation of a network’s expansion, nor do they account for other access methods such as 
mobile telephony, satellite and digital channels, which are currently used by citizens of developing 
and developed countries to access national and global networks.  
                                                          
1 The strength of this indicator is based on three aspects: a) a phone at home is considered the closest 
connection of citizens in times of emergency or distress; b) it captures countries’ specificities such as 
different household sizes; c) and it is related to income level. The ITU (1998b) considers that 
countries with household penetration of 90% or above to have reached universal service.  
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 The rapid pace of technological developments, and economic constraints still faced by developing 
markets are also inducing administrators to review the notion of universality in two directions. The 
first, concerned with new telecommunication services availability, suggests an enhanced version of 
the network that encompasses main telephone lines, mobile cellular subscribers and digital access. 
The second focuses on accessibility to the network and stresses the existence of an access point (e.g. a 
telephone) within reasonable distance for everyone. Table 1 summarizes some indicators related to 
each concept. 
 
Table 1. Universal Service and Universal Access Indicators 
Universal Service (availability) Universal Access (accessibility) 
 
% of households with a telephone 
 
Mobidensity (Number of fixed 
lines plus mobile cellular lines per 
hundred inhabitants) 
 
Digital access (ISDN channels) 
 
 
Access to a telephone established in terms 
of: 
- time or distance from a telephone 
- minimum population units per 
phone 
 
Payphones per 1000 inhabitants/ or per 
main lines 
 
    Source: ITU (1998b) 
 
 Some authors argue that these concepts address different problems and are not mutually 
exclusive. Service availability and accessibility can complement each other to the degree to which 
new technologies capable of supporting information services (wireless, satellite) increase the means 
of interconnection to national networks, making them more affordable to the public. Hudson (2000) 
considers that the economic and demographic diversity of developing countries demand a “multi-
leveled” definition of access identifying expansion targets within communities, institutions and 
households. Minges (1999a, 1999b) advocates for a similar model that places universal access as a 
step towards universal service. He illustrates the situation through the example of the recent evolution 
of the Swiss telephone system. Between 1995 and 1998, the teledensity in Switzerland decreased 
from 60.6 to 56 main lines/100 people, as a result of residential and commercial customers migrating 
to mobile cellular services and ISDN networks. However, the author argues, the network as an 
aggregate -including all three services- actually grew more than 20%, adding up to a million 
subscribers over the same period.  
 Responding to completely different realities and needs, the mobile cellular networks of countries 
such as in Lesotho, Cote d’Ivoire, Paraguay and Venezuela have reached penetrations equivalent to 
half of the national teledensity (ITU 1999, 2000). Wireless communications are used to overcome 
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geographic and financial barriers commonly encountered in the deployment of services in developing 
nations. Although the experience there is not new, it does indicate how technologies that act as 
product substitutes for the fixed telephone can enhance our definition of basic services2. 
 Attending to the changing meaning of basic service and universality, Hudson proposes that 
developing countries should understand universal access as a "dynamic concept with a set of moving 
targets".  It should not tie goals to specific technology or service provider (e.g. wired or wireless 
service), but rather state them in terms of "functions and capabilities, such as ability to transmit voice 
and data" (2000:3). This view can open to administrators new alternatives for policy design through a 
“multi-network” perspective, one that considers the total sum of capabilities enabling a citizen’s 
access to a national telecommunication network. Criticism of the “multi-network” perspective arises 
from the difficulties in accounting for penetration of new services (e.g. mobile telephony) by social 
strata and geographical area. The ITU considers that broadening the definition to these services “may 
lead to telecommunications investment becoming narrowly focused upon those who can afford to pay 
for the new services thereby increasing regional disparities and exacerbating information poverty.” 
(1998b, p.85).  
 In its latest review of the concept, and despite important transformations in technology and the 
structure of markets, the ITU has assumed a fairly traditional definition of universal service, avoiding 
major discussions about possible redistribution mechanisms for telecommunications investment, and 
new statistical mechanisms allowing higher accountability. In the 1998 World Telecommunication 
Development Report, the organization concludes that there is  “no compelling reason, at present, to 
expand the definition of universal service to include individual access to information services” (85). 
The report advocates for a “practical definition of universal access” that targets “increased levels of 
household telephone penetration” in developed countries, and “community access through the 
provision of public telephones” in developing nations (p.90).  
 This conceptual divergence is interpreted as the result of the growing gap between the poorest 
nations that are struggling to build a basic telephone network, and the wealthiest countries already 
engaged in the creation of the information superhighway. As Gil-Egui and Steward assert, the 
consequence of such a dichotomy is a “dual rhetoric that speaks of universality of plain old telephone 
for the Third World and broadband for the First World” disregarding the higher upgrading cost that 
the poorest nations will have to face in the future (Gil-Egui & Steward, 1999, p. 2). 
 However, this paper argues that the inherent contradictions of such distinctions can be overcome 
through a multi-network approach that extends USO to all technological solutions existing in the 
                                                          
2
 In fact, the WTO Secretariat recognizes the multi-access notion through the inclusion of mobile services and 
circuit-switched data transmissions, along with voice telephone services, in the list of services ruled by the 1997 
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market and takes into account user' preferences and active role in defining different levels to gain 
access to the national network. This would require further development of competition as well as 
more effective and flexible regulation to target market imbalances in dynamic technological 
scenarios. In the dawn of a second generation of telecommunication reforms in developing countries, 
an assessment of universal service policies played out in these nations during a period better 
characterized as the transition to total competition can shed light on available paths to attain universal 
service. 
 Risks and opportunities of liberalization 
 Since the onset of liberalization, a considerable amount of research has tried to test the 
implications of telecommunication reform attending to economic and technological criteria. As 
Mosco (1988) warns, few of these efforts have gone beyond dichotomist discussions that oppose 
public to private, and government control to free market. Although this research has produced 
detailed descriptions of the new industry structure, pricing strategies and regulations, most of the time 
it misses the opportunity to assess the way in which market constraints have been rebuilt, and the 
implications of such changes for diverse social groups. Different approaches to liberalization have 
included a diverse mix of ownership strategies (privatization, corporatization, strategic partnership, 
leasing of basic infrastructure), and levels of market competition (private monopoly, duopolies, 
competing product substitute markets).  This diversity of strategies makes it virtually impossible to 
talk about a typology of approaches to telecommunication reform. However, efforts should be made 
to assess the social implications of the different market structures and practices brought about by 
liberalization.  
 Here, I shall suggest that one way to discuss the different approaches to reform can be related to 
the reconceptualization of USO and other conditions for network expansion, which have particularly 
important repercussions for developing countries embarked on those reforms. Through USO, the 
State reformulates the relationship between operators, the public and the regulator. USO also targets 
market inefficiencies, setting some conditions for operation without hampering the economics of the 
business. They should be designed to meet the needs of particular populations with problems of 
access attending to claims of the public. 
 Comparative studies of telecommunications reform in developing countries have mainly focused 
on the dichotomy of controlled versus free markets. Typically, these analyses contrast the outcomes 
of liberalized versus regulated scenarios in an attempt to identify the benefits or setbacks of 
liberalization. A number of different studies have found in common an immediate “efficiency effect” 
after reform, with a tendency for slow-down overtime (Grande, 1994; Petrazzini, 1995; Straubhaar et 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
GATS commitments or limitations on market access and national treatment for basic telecommunications.   
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al., 1995). General assessments on the impact of liberalization policies on developing countries lend 
weight to a positive view that shows increasing penetration at the household and small firm levels 
(Petrazzini, 1996).  
 Other studies have explored the impact of privatization on network growth. In their account of 
teledensity evolution in Asian and Latin American countries that underwent liberalization policies in 
the first half of the 1990s, Petrazzini and Clark (1996) found that “in countries with privatized 
telecommunication (penetration) grew twice as fast compared with countries that did not privatize” 
(p.37). The authors also examine the effect of competition on the rollout of new services such as 
cellular phones. Testing variables possibly affecting cellular density growth such as GDP levels, 
researchers found that none of them was as important as competition. 
 More recently, Jayakar (September, 2000) empirically tests changes in residential teledensity in 
30 countries as a function of economic growth, diffusion effects and three policy variables: 
ownership, industry structure and regulatory independence. The research identified diffusion effects 
and policy variables as significant predictors of telephone penetration at the household level. The 
author tests the model accounting for possible differences between rich and poorer countries. 
Interestingly, variables such as privatization or de-monopolization were found not significant as 
explanatory variables of growth in household service penetration. Gutierrez and Berg (2000) examine 
institutional, regulatory and economic determinants of telephone penetration in Latin America 
through a longitudinal study of 19 countries (1985-1995). A multiple regression analysis identifies 
income, political democracy, changes in the regulatory environment (including privatization) and the 
growth of cellular phones as the most relevant factors accounting for the expansion of fixed telephone 
networks. These findings agree with previous assessments (Mody & Tsui, 1995) that support the idea 
that competition and the presence of an independent regulator, rather than a simple shift from public 
to private ownership, are key to network expansion.  
 For countries with populations historically deprived of telecommunication services, the idea of 
overall network expansion seems to fulfill the promises brought about by liberalization. However, 
after more than a decade of liberal policies, almost two thirds of Latin American households do not 
have fixed telephones yet, and the penetration of mobile and fixed phones combined only covered 
50% of the population (ITU, 2000). The region has become a major puzzle.  It has hardly any unmet 
demand of telecommunication services3, and yet, there are low rates of service penetration. A 
considerable ‘depressed’ demand seems to be one of the unwanted consequences of liberalization in 
                                                          
3
 Conventional statistics of telephone demand, as revealed in waiting lists reported by operators, 
estimate 92% of demand in Latin America has been satisfied. (ITU, 2000:89) 
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the region (ITU, 2000:3). Rising local access prices, fostered in the context of tariff rebalancing, 
threaten to exclude a good part of the population. 
 As Milne notes (2000), tariff rebalancing is a necessary condition for an industry undergoing 
severe changes in its market structure. On the one hand, in competitive markets prices must reflect 
underlying costs, and basic services should operate without cross-subsidies received in the past from 
long distance or other services. On the other hand, technological innovations have affected the cost 
structure of the business, and incumbent companies need to adjust their tariffs to patterns that made 
them competitive. Even in those countries with closed markets for basic services, monopolies face 
competitive pressures of call back services, mobile cellular phones and IP telephony that become 
substitutes of fixed telephony.  
 Price rebalancing has tended to raise residential rentals facing operators and regulators with the 
dilemma of balancing sustainability and affordability of the service4. The tensions between the two 
conflicting goals are higher in low and middle-income countries where scarce economic sources limit 
the ability of maneuver of market agents. Testing a model that relates telephone service affordability 
to income distribution, Milne found that in low and middle-income nations price restructuring leading 
to significant increase in residential charges, “risks driving some subscribers off the network, and can 
slow down the rate of network expansion” (2000:919). It is important to assess how issues of pricing 
relate to service penetration. Do they support or hinder universal service goals? What alternative 
solutions are giving regulator of less developed countries to the tensions between liberalization and 
service affordability? 
 By comparing trends of telephone cost and telephone service penetration in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela during the last decade, this paper discusses how different 
approaches to telecommunication reform have fostered higher levels of access in developing 
countries during the transition from state monopolies to total liberalization. The discussion is framed 
by a survey of the universal service policies put in place by the six countries, and an analysis of their 
performance indicators. The goal is to draw lessons that would help to improve the regulatory 
strategies of telecommunication administrators, and to discuss the implications for new forms of 
governance defined in more liberalized scenarios.  The key question is, have these changes 
contributed, and if so, in what ways, to more balanced and fairer systems of communication in 
developing countries? 
                                                          
4
 Reviewing preview studies on effects of tariff rebalancing, Milne (2000) concludes that rebalancing 
inevitably favors some customer groups over others, in particular heavy users (typically business and 
high income groups). However, outcomes of the evaluations differ from country to country, or 
between social groups. The author hypothesizes that income levels of the nation or community make 
a difference. 
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METHODOLOGY 
♦ Design of the study 
 The analysis focuses on the elaboration of country profiles that identify the nation’s universal 
service policy as defined in contracts and bylaws designed by telecommunication administrators. This 
study follows Hudson's (2000) proposed model for evaluation of universal access in developing 
nations presenting the evolution of different performance indicators over an eleven-year period. 
Finally, a comparative assessment discusses the ways in which universal service regulations have 
unfolded in the studied countries relating them to new forms of governance brought by liberal 
reforms.  
♦ Data 
 In 1997, the International Telecommunication Union started to keep track and report trends in 
telecommunication reform worldwide through the Sector Reform Unit (SRU), an arm of the 
Telecommunication Development Bureau (BDT). The work generated by the SRU included country 
profiles available on the World Wide Web. These data as well as the latest assessment of the Inter-
American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL, 2000) on universal service are used as primary 
data sources. An evaluation of service penetration by country is supported with indicators gathered 
from the ITU’s Stars database (2000) and ITU's Americas Telecommunication Indicators (2000). 
♦ Operational definitions 
 Universal Service and Universal Access. In line with the redefinition of universal service to 
include more than the wired telephone, this study looks at advances in universal service goals through 
two different indicators: (1) the percentage of households with a telephone line5; and (2) telephone 
penetration defined as the sum of dedicated lines plus wireless lines (mobile cellular) per 100 
inhabitants. Both indexes combined are considered as a unique indicator of telephone penetration. 
 Progress in universal access is measured as the number of payphones per 1000 inhabitants. 
Although the indicator does not account for rural versus urban penetration, it serves as a reference of 
the number of people that may have access to a neighboring telephone. Public telephony as a 
percentage of the overall fixed-line network can be used as a parameter to measure commitment that 
administrators and operators may have to spread the service.  
 Liberalization. This concept is operationalized as the year in which the supply of basic 
telephone service is liberalized through the introduction of competition in local or long distance 
services, or through the introduction of competition in products which substitute for the local service, 
such as mobile cellular services.  
                                                          
5
 This indicator is estimated using a proxy based on number of residential lines as a percentage of 
households. Data was gathered from the ITU Start database. 
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 Service affordability. The major components of pricing of the fixed telephony are installation 
charge, a one-time charge for new user, and the monthly subscription charge, applicable to all users.  
This study includes data on price of line installation as percentage of annual average per capita 
income, and monthly connection charge as percentage of monthly average per capita income. Same 
indicators are presented for mobile cellular telephony as a way to observe the competitive pressures 
played out in the process of tariff rebalancing. Data for this exercise is gathered from the ITU Start 
database. Some limitations for comparison arise from the lack of available information for all the 
eleven points in times.  
 
COUNTRIES OVERVIEW 
Argentina 
In 1990 the Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL), a state owned monopoly, was 
privatized and split into two separate regional companies that enjoyed a seven-year monopoly on 
basic services with a possible extension for 10 years based on satisfying contract requirements i. 
These requirements were laid out in 1991 in terms of the amount of investment to be made in the 
whole network, without specifying areas or services to be included in USO. The target was to achieve 
an average annual growth rate of 6% for the next 5 years. Government oversight was limited to 
determining the quality of operation. A newly created regulatory agency was mandated to guarantee, 
among other things, universal service. Operators assumed the expressed commitment to serve 400 
areas in the northern region, and 280 in the southern region through public and semi-public service 
plans, and licenses were granted to independent operators who had been handling areas not covered 
by the public enterprise (CITEL, 2000). In spite of the mostly competitive environment, lack of 
interconnection regulations retarded the full operation of these licensed carriers during these first 
years (Straubhaar et al., 1995). 
From the outset of the reform, competition was allowed in value-added services, private 
networks, satellite transmissions and mobile cellular services. Cellular operators were organized into 
regional duopoly markets. The main two competing companies were Movicom and Movistar. The 
first began operations in the country in 1989 when a consortium led by BellSouth was awarded a 
license to introduce the service in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. In line with the 1990 
privatization plan, Telefónica and Telecom were subsidized to compete in this market. However, in 
1993 both companies became partners in the creation of Movistar and its service: the Miniphone. This 
association lasted until October 1999 when the joint venture was closed due to differences between 
the partners. Subscribers were then distributed between two companies: TCP and Telecom Personal. 
Table 2 presents the evolution of telephone penetration in Argentina. In this liberalized environment, 
 Universal Service 12 
fixed lines kept growing over the last decade. This growth has slowed down while mobile telephony 
reached record rates of expansion.  
 
Table 2. Argentina- Telephone penetration   
Source: ITU Stars Database  
 
One of the major achievements in Argentina has been a consistent increase of accessibility and 
availability of telephone services (Table 3). Household penetration grew at average annual rates of 
10% with a marked deceleration of this tendency after the target year of 1996, when the process 
became markedly more competitive. Expansion of public telephony indicates a compromise to serve 
social needs. 
Table 3. Argentina - Accessibility and availability  
Source: ITU Stars Database  
  
However, the major change experienced at the end of the first phase of liberalization was the 
tremendous growth of mobile telephony. The major factor accounting for this growth was the 
introduction of the Calling Party Pays (CPP), a system whereby the caller is charged for making the 
call. This tariff scheme, along with the steady decrease of relative cost in subscription costs (Table 4), 
boosted mobile telephony increasing the penetration of the service 180% during two consecutive 
years (1997-1998).  
 
Table 4. Argentina- Telephone service affordability 
Source: ITU Stars Database 
ARGENTINA
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Fixed phone connection/ income per capita 49.8 16.4 11.0 10.7 6.7 6.7 3.2 3.0 1.8
Mobile phone connection/ income per capita 8.0 5.6 3.2 2.9 3.0
Res. mon. phone subc./ monthly per capita income 4.0 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.9
Res. mon. mobile subc./ monthly per capita income 7.2 5.8 5.7 5.3 5.5 4.8 4.5
ARGENTINA Reform
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 Phonelines per 100 inh. 10.0 9.6 9.3 9.5 10.8 11.8 13.7 15.9 17.4 18.8 19.7 20.1 21.5
Cell.Pho. per 100 inh. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.6 4.5 7.0 12.1 12.2
Telephone Penetration 10.0 9.6 9.3 9.6 10.9 12.1 14.4 16.9 19.0 23.2 26.7 32.2 33.7
ARGENTINA Reform
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
% of residential lines 74.9 75.6 76.0 78.0 80.0 81.0 81.0 83.0 82.3 85.0 83.8
Residential phones/ 100 households 28.7 27.8 27.1 28.5 32.7 36.2 41.8 49.4 53.6 59.3 61.0
% Payphones/main lines 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5
Payphones per 1000 inh. 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.6 3.0
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 The restructuring stage, which guaranteed exclusivity to regional monopolies, was extended 
until 1999. In this period conceptualized as a transition toward total competition, licenses for basic 
service operators contained a detailed list of USO, which included: installation of semi-public long 
distance service in every community of 80 to 500 people; installation of wirelines in communities 
where at least 30 customers request the service; and new targets to enhance the public telephone 
network. In addition to these requirements in infrastructure development, in July 1999, the 
government passed General Regulations on Universal Services, which extended infrastructure 
commitments, and created three universal service categories: high-cost areas, specific customers and 
specific services. The actual plans recently designed to match these concepts aim at providing service 
to retirees, pensioners, low consumption customers, users with physical limitations, and educational 
and health institutions. The Regulations established that providers of telecommunication services 
must contribute to the Universal Service Fund with a percentage of total income earned from 
operations. The new legislation adopted a dynamic concept of universal service with periodic review. 
 
 Brazil 
 By the beginning of the 1990s, Telebrás was a holding company with 28 subsidiaries 
representing 27 local operators and a long distance carrier, Embratel. The holding served 91% of 
Brazilian fixed telephone subscribers. The remaining 9% was in the hands of four independent 
operators. Uneven development was the main characteristic of the Brazilian corporation by the late 
1980s. Seventy-three percent of Telebrás' revenue came from Embratel and Telesp, the local operator 
of wealthy Sao Paulo state. Although the transition to a democratic regime reaffirmed the public 
monopoly in telecommunications in the new constitution of 1988, the new political scenario brought 
about changes to the state run corporation. Telebrás started to trade its shares in the stock market in 
1989, creating a system in which the state sold its stock in the company, while retaining managerial 
control. By the mid-1990s, it was estimated that foreign investor held 36.7% of the equity (Worhlers 
de Almeida, 1998).  
 The Brazilian approach to reform was not privatization but the maintenance of state control 
over a corporation funded with public capital that faced competition in different markets. In August 
1995 the Cardoso government launched the reform of public institutions including the telecom reform 
that began with the removal of the constitutional monopoly reserved to Telebrás. Priority was given 
to promote competition in the cellular telephone market, satellite telecommunication, data 
transmission, and other added-value services. Other important steps of the reform included tariff 
rebalancing, the merger of operators into regional groups, and the implementation of autonomous 
management structures. In 1997 the government awarded 10 licenses for mobile telephony, thus 
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introducing competition into this market. Table 5 clearly shows that the State-run holding attained 
considerable improvements in telephone penetration before privatization.  
Table 5. Brazil- Telephone penetration   
Source: ITU Stars Database 
In 1998 Telebras was divided and sold in a public bid establishing a duopoly system, which 
will operate until 2002. The government used privatization to attract foreign capital to finance the 
external deficit of the balance of payments, and to obtain fresh sources for the Treasury. Telebrás was 
broken up vertically and regionally into -12 sub holding companies and sold separately. Three 
regional operators offered a mix of wired telephony for local services and internal region long 
distance (the Baby Braz: T1/Telco North-Northeast/ T2, T2/Telco Center-South, and T3/Telesp); one 
operator for national and international long distance (Embratel); an eight spin-off creators supplying 
mobile telephony. The most profitable is Telesp, which serves Sao Paulo (ITU, 2000). The same year 
as privatization a new Decree on the General Plan of Universal Goals set USO binding license 
holders for the fixed telephone service. The plan sets goals of individual and collective access, and 
pays special attention to educational and health institutions with demands for advanced services and 
to individuals with special needs. Under this environment, telephone accessibility and availability 
continued to advance at a good pace (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Brazil- Accessibility and availability  
Source: ITU Stars Database 
 
One of the major achievements of the Brazilian strategy was the tariff rebalancing process. 
The Cardoso government radically adjusted the structure of the price system. The result was a cut in 
installation charges from a peak of 1,500 US dollars in 1992 to 50 US dollar in 1998 (ITU, 2000). 
The adjustment combined with the adjustment of the Brazilian currency and a better overall economic 
performance drove the relative costs of the service down (Table 7) . 
BRAZIL Reform
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
% of residential lines 70.0 69.0 69.5 70.0 70.0 69.0 67.9 67.6 68.1 69.0 n/a
Residential phones/ 100 households 16.8 17.0 17.8 18.7 19.8 20.0 21.1 22.4 25.3 28.6 28.6
% Payphones/main lines 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8
Payphones per 1000 inh. 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.0
BRAZIL Reform
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 Phonelines per 100 inh. 6.2 6.5 6.8 7.3 7.4 8.0 8.5 9.6 10.6 12.1 14.9 14.9
Cell.Pho. per 100 inh. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.6 2.8 4.7 8.9 13.6
Telephone Penetration 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.3 7.6 8.4 9.3 11.1 13.4 16.7 23.8 28.5
 Universal Service 15 
Table 7. Brazil- Telephone service affordability 
Source: ITU Stars Database  
 
 
Chile 
 For most of the 20th century the Chilean telecommunication system evolved as a private 
enterpriseii. During the period of state control (1973-1986), the national system was reorganized into 
two regional monopolies for local services, CTC and ENTEL.  Competition in long distance was 
introduced in 1986, the same year that key components of CTC and ENTEL were privatized. During 
the first period of liberalization (1986-1993) the government set no USO. This left the pace of 
network expansion to market forces. In this environment, telephone density grew at a healthy annual 
average rate of 16%. In spite of the strong growth of mobile and fixed telephony (Table 8), by the 
early 1990s the network was showing two major flaws: a virtual halt of service growth in rural areas, 
and the decrease of payphone penetration (SUBTEL, 2000). Figures in Table 10 clearly depict the 
problem. The situation also revealed the flaw in having a weak regulatory agency with few legal tools 
at its disposal to deal with the problem. 
 
Table 8. Chile- Telephone penetration   
Source: ITU Stars Database  
 
Table 9. Chile - Accessibility and availability  
Source: ITU Stars Database  
CHILE Reform
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
% of residential lines 68.0 70.4 70.4 72.0 72.3 75.5 75.5 76.9 77.0 77.0 77.2 77.0 77.0 77.0
Residential phones/ 100 households 13.8 14.5 14.9 16.1 16.4 22.4 27.0 33.4 39.0 40.1 45.3 52.6 56.6 66.2
% Payphones/main lines 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
Payphones per 1000 inh. 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9
CHILE Reform
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 Phonelines per 100 inh. 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.0 6.6 7.9 9.5 11.0 11.3 12.7 14.9 16.1 18.6 20.7 22.1
Cell.Pho. per 100 inh. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.4 2.2 2.8 6.5 15.1 22.4
Telephone Penetration 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.0 6.7 8.2 9.9 11.7 12.1 14.1 17.1 18.9 25.1 35.8 44.5
BRAZIL
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Fixed phone connection/ income per capita 49.2 26.9 22.7 1.5 0.9
Mobile phone connection/ income per capita 8.6 8.0 6.7 6.1
Res. mon. phone subc./ monthly per capita income 0.2 0.8 0.7 1.7 1.7
Res. mon. mobile subc./ monthly per capita income 12.5 7.9 6.6 6.0
 Universal Service 16 
In 1994, an amendment to the law established a Development Fund with contributions from 
long distance service providers. This was aimed at subsidizing the expansion of public telephones in 
marginal, low-income and rural areas. The reform privileged universal access goals over universal 
service provision. The standard for universal access formulated by law mandated at least one 
payphone in any community with more than 60 inhabitants, located at least half an hour's driving 
from the next nearest telephone. Preliminary estimates indicate that at the current rate of expansion, 
80% of the rural population will be covered by the year 2002 (SUBTEL, 2000). In 1999 an important 
amendment to the law changed the original goal of “payphone” to “telecommunication services”. 
Although the ramifications of the shift are as yet unclear, it may suggest a move away from universal 
access to universal service definition. The Chilean Secretariat of Telecommunications has 
acknowledged the need for adding rules that boost access to telecommunication services, mainly in 
the case of lower income groups of the population.  
 Over the 1990s, the affordability of the telephone service in Chile was guaranteed by the 
sustained improvement of the economy as a whole. Chile has one of the world's cheapest tariffs 
systems for long distance service but the installation costs and rates for local calls (11 US cents per 
minute) are above the regional average (ITU 2000). The consistent increase of the overall income 
level keep the relative cost of the service down making it affordable to the population (Table 10).  
Table 10. Chile- Telephone service affordability  
  
 Mexico 
 In 1990 a consortium led by Grupo Carso from Mexico, in partnership with BellSouth and 
France Telecom, bought 20% of Teléfonos de México (TELMEX) stock, thus acquiring rights to 
operate a monopoly of basic services until 1996 iii. Once laws removing caps on foreign investment 
were lifted, the government then also sold its holding to international investors. Regional duopolies 
were established for mobile cellular services. TELMEX was able to participate in all these markets 
through its subsidiary -TELCEL- (Straubhaar at al., 1995). During this period, TELMEX was 
required: a) to achieve an average annual growth of 12% in main lines through 1994, b) by 1994, to 
install payphones in each town with a population greater than 500, and c) to raise the payphone 
penetration up to 2 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1994, and 5 per 1,000 in 1998.  The Telecommunication 
Act of 1995 laid out social coverage as an objective for public networks. The mandate was formulated 
CHILE
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Fixed phone connection/ income per capita 8.0 n/a 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.2
Res. mon. phone subc./ monthly per capita income 5.68 n/a 5.15 4.52 4.17 3.98
 Universal Service 17 
through new plans for rural and public telephony, providing cellular facilities to grocery stores, health 
centers and mobile satellite connection to medical services (ITU 2000).  
 In 1996, the long distance market was opened to competition while the basic service continued 
to be developed under regional duopolies through the entrance of other providers that competed with 
TELMEX. Expansion of fixed lines has kept conservative rates while mobile telephony has double 
after the end of the exclusivity period.  
 
Table 11. Mexico- Telephone penetration   
 Source: ITU Stars Database  
 By that year the company had only partially fulfilled USO established by the concession. The 
annual growth target was attained during the first four years of privatization, but network expansion 
dropped to 4% in 1994 and 5% in 1995. In 1996, it experienced zero-growth. At the same time, the 
increase in overall telephone penetration was not comparable to the growth in household penetration 
suggesting that the expansion was driven by commercial demand. TELMEX met the 1994 target in 
payphones. But the number of public phones declined in 1996. And TELMEX fell far short of 
fulfilling its 1998 requirement (see Table 12).  
 
Table 12. Mexico - Accessibility and availability  
Source: ITU Stars Database  
 
An important flaw in the Mexican strategy stemmed from the lack of population data needed 
to estimate the coverage of the payphone network. By 1998, TELMEX had provided the service to 
16,000 localities with more than 500 inhabitants. However, most rural towns have less than 500 
inhabitants leaving almost 10 million people (10% of the population) out of expansion plans for 
public telephony (ITU, 1998b).  
MEXICO Reform
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
% of residential lines 69.0 70.0 69.9 71.0 70.9 71.7 71.0 71.0 74.1 74.6 74.6 n/a
Residential phones/ 100 households 19.3 20.3 21.8 23.7 25.6 28.2 30.6 33.2 35.3 33.9 34.5 34.5
% Payphones/main lines 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.7 3.2 3.2
Payphones per 1000 inh. 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.4 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.5 3.1 3.3
MEXICO Reform
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 Phonelines per 100 inh. 5.1 5.3 5.8 6.5 6.8 7.5 8.4 9.2 9.4 9.3 9.7 10.4 11.2 12.5
Cell.Pho. per 100 inh. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.8 3.5 7.8 14.2
Telephone Penetration 5.1 5.3 5.8 6.6 7.0 7.9 8.8 9.8 10.1 10.4 11.5 13.8 19.0 26.7
 Universal Service 18 
Facing economic pressures during the peso crisis, TELMEX held expansion plans back. 
However, over the same period, mobile cellular service penetration was growing by rates between 
20% and 90% per year. The growth of mobile telephony was based on two pricing strategies: CPP 
and pre-paid plans. Although the tariff rebalancing process situated fixed phone in a competitive 
position (Table 13), by the end of 1999 85% of TELMEX cellular subscribers were using the pre-paid 
plan "Amigo" (ITU, 2000). Cofetel, the Mexican regulator, currently reviews the CPP system to 
determine if revenue split (20/5 US cents) between mobile and fixed operators reflects the costs of 
both operators. The underlying question is if a system that sets advantages to mobile users is in fact 
discriminating against subscribers of fixed-lines. As the price of mobile services continues falling the 
disadvantage for fixed-phone users will become more evident.  
 
Table 13.- Mexico- Telephone service affordability 
Source: ITU Stars Database 
 Recent accounts of the post-liberalization period have shown that USO constituted a major 
point of contention between TELMEX and competitors in disputes over interconnection and 
regulatory transparency (Burkart, 2000; Gómez-Mont 2000). By 1999, the regulatory authority had 
not identified a universal service program that balanced the interests of all providers in the market. 
TELMEX wanted to have USO reduced, eased or shared with competitors. However it was also ready 
to use USO as an argument to justify high interconnection charges. As Burkart notes, "with so little 
put into expanding the [network], either through interconnection or through and aggressive universal 
service plan, the development of markets of basic services cannot proceed." (2000:235)  
 
 Peru 
 In May 1994 Telefónica of Spain bought 35% of Telefónica del Peru (TP), a newly created consortium 
that consolidated local and long distance operators, Entel and CPT, into one national company. The transaction 
ranked TP as the company with the highest cost per line in the region. The outcome surprised observers who 
considered that the four-year exclusivity period awarded to the company was particularly short in comparison 
with previous privatizations (e.g. Mexico, Venezuela). The high value of TP stemmed from market power 
guaranteed in the monopoly franchise -including mobile telephony-, which in fact promoted the vertical 
integration of the holding and reducing competitive pressures of product substitute (mobile telephony, see Table 
11) during the first years of the privatization (Briceño, 1999).  
MEXICO
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Fixed phone connection/ income per capita 9.9 15.5 10.8 11.9 12.0 11.7 9.2 6.8 2.9 2.5
Mobile phone connection/ income per capita 16.3 3.7 3.5 3.2 0.6 0.6 0.4
Res. mon. phone subc./ monthly per capita income 1.1 1.8 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.2 2.9 3.3 3.9 3.9
Res. mon. mobile subc./ monthly per capita income 13.4 13.9 13.2 12.0 12.1 10.7 10.0 8.6 7.2
 Universal Service 19 
Table 14. Peru- Telephone penetration   
   
The monopoly franchise established goals of network expansion (250,000 new lines by the 
year 1999), and provisions for the installation of at least one telephone in 1,540 rural settlements with 
population over 500 inhabitants. Under the framework of the franchise commitments, TP agreed with 
the regulatory agency, Osiptel, on a program of telecenters developed in partnership with small 
entrepreneurs aimed at providing public telephony to low-income areas. In 1995 the plan was 
enhanced through the program of Cabinas Públicas, telecenters that offer Internet access. The 
Scientific Peruvian Network (Red Científica Peruana) opened the first of these centers in 1995. Since 
that year, the telecenter network has continuously grown becoming a prosperous network of 1,000 
sites. The demand is driving prices down and the cost of one hour of computer/Internet connection 
currently varies between 0.7 and 0.85 US dollar (Proenza et al., 2000).  
Table 15. Peru - Accessibility and availability  
Source: ITU Stars Database  
 
 At the end of the monopoly (1999), the major success of the reform in Peru was the strong 
growth of public access (see Table 15). Household penetration and fixed phone expansion has 
stagnated since 1996. A somehow repressed demand seemed to have jumped on the bandwagon of 
mobile telephone expansion. As with the case of Argentina, the introduction of CPP systems in 1996, 
combined with pre-paid plans, triggered demand for cellular phones, which already enjoyed a more 
competitive price structure (Table 16). The reform fulfilled the goal of tariff rebalancing of fixed 
telephony, but during the period of adjustment, the demand moved to the cheaper option available in 
the market. By the end of 1998 TP introduced the "Popular Telephone", a pre-paid plan for fixed 
subscribers that a year later accounted for 14% of all TP's customers (ITU, 2000). The experience 
PERU Reform
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
% of residential lines 72.6 70.0 70.0 70.6 n/a n/a n/a 82.0 82.0 n/a n/a
Residential phones/ 100 households 9.6 9.6 9.0 10.1 n/a n/a n/a 25.0 28.1 28.1 n/a
% Payphones/main lines 0.0 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 3.0 3.6
Payphones per 1000 inh. 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.4
PERU Reform
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 Phonelines per 100 inh. 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.3 4.7 6.0 6.8 6.3 6.7 6.4
Cell.Pho. per 100 inh. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8 1.8 3.0 4.0 4.0
Telephone Penetration 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.5 5.0 6.8 8.5 9.3 10.7 10.4
 Universal Service 20 
speaks of the need and opportunities for options that reach a demand restricted by economic 
difficulties. 
Table 16. Peru- Telephone service affordability 
 
Venezuela 
 The privatization of the C.A. Teléfonos de Venezuela (CANTV) was part of the 
reorganization of state enterprises, a plan inscribed into major economic reforms undertaken by 
Venezuela in 1989 iv. A consortium led by GTE won the auction of 40% of the shares by the end of 
1991. Eleven percent of the stock was allocated to company workers. The remaining 49% of stock 
originally in the hands of the State, has been partially sold in national and international stock markets. 
Today 89% of CANTV’s equity is privately held.  
 CANTV monopolized local and long distance services for 10 years, with the exception of 
public telephony, a business which the government allowed new entrants into to supply service in 
areas not covered by CANTV.  Five years after privatization, the government had licensed 30 firms in 
public telephony and 3 for rural areas. But long discussions over interconnection fees and what 
constituted “not attended” areas delayed the growth of competition in these segments. Since 1990, the 
mobile cellular market has operated as a duopoly, in which CANTV competes through a subsidiary 
(TELCEL). Full competition prevails in private networks and value-added services. 
 The concession for the basic service monopoly committed CANTV to meet goals of 
quality and service expansion specified by regions. The requirements included the addition of 
355,000 new lines per year between 1992 and 2000, with fixed caps for new public telephones. After 
1995, making use of contractual provisions, CANTV renegotiated these requirements arguing that the 
recession in the Venezuelan economy since 1993 has drastically altered the scenarios for demand 
originally envisaged in the concession. Conatel, a sector regulator that has been shaken by constant 
changes in its administration, has led the renegotiation of terms of the concession. As in Mexico, 
PERU
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Fixed phone connection/ income per capita 27.1 17.1 17.3 32.2 25.2 20.0 17.1 13.1 5.9
Mobile phone connection/ income per capita
Res. mon. phone subc./ monthly per capita income 4.5 1.0 0.9 2.0 3.6 4.3 5.7 7.3 7.0
Res. mon. mobile subc./ monthly per capita income 26.8 22.9 11.6 12.2
 Universal Service 21 
economic recession impacted heavily on targets for telephone service penetration, an indicator that 
has experienced negative growth in recent years (Table 17).  
Table 17. Venezuela- Telephone service penetration  
Source: ITU Stars Database 
 
However, unlike the Mexican case, household service penetration in Venezuela has increased 
at a faster pace (Table 18). Waiting lists, which were mainly composed by residential customers, has 
disappeared. This trend, in the context of decreasing fixed phone penetration was accompanied by a 
very strong expansion of mobile cellular services, a phenomenon that indicates the migration of the 
demand for basic services from wired networks to wireless services.  
Table 18. Venezuela - Accessibility and availability  
Source: ITU Stars Database  
 
Today, Venezuela is one of twelve telecom systems worldwide where there are more mobile 
subscribers than fixed lines in use. Various factors account for the phenomenon. First, the political 
tension and turmoil that characterized Venezuela during the past decade frustrated efforts by the 
regulator at different times to rebalance tariffs. Second, the economic performance of the country 
never kept up with the process of devaluation of the Venezuelan currency. As a result, fixed 
telephone charges have become more expensive in relative terms (Table 19). Third, aggressive 
competition in the market of mobile telephony was based on the implementation of pre-paid plans 
accounting for the 73% of the subscriber base (ITU, 2000).  
 
 
VENEZUELA Reform
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 Phonelines per 100 inh. 7.9 7.8 8.2 8.1 9.0 10.0 10.9 11.4 11.7 12.2 11.7 10.9 10.9
Cell.Pho. per 100 inh. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.5 1.9 2.6 4.7 8.7 14.3 14.4
Telephone Penetration 7.9 7.8 8.3 8.2 9.3 10.8 12.4 13.2 14.3 16.9 20.3 25.2 25.3
VENEZUELA Reform
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
% residential lines 70.0 68.3 68.3 69.0 68.0 69.0 67.6 67.9 68.6 70.0 71.1
Residential phones/ 100 households 30.3 28.1 26.3 30.7 33.5 37.7 40.5 41.8 44.7 47.8 45.9
% Payphones/main lines 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.8
Payphones per 1000 inh. 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.5 3.0 3.2
 Universal Service 22 
Table 19. Venezuela- Telephone service affordability  
Source: ITU Stars Database  
 
In 2000 the government and Congress cooperated on setting up a new regulatory framework to open 
the market of basic services. A new Telecommunication Act was recently approved including the creation of a 
Universal Service Fund with contributions of for-profit telecommunication service operators of 1% of their 
annual gross income. The Act assumed an active concept of universal service, encompassing all available 
services in the market (including Internet access), and the government launched an e-government initiative, 
which required all regional and national authorities to offer electronic services by the year 2002.  
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRENDS 
 
 Has liberalization delivered the promises set forth a decade ago? In some terms, it has exceeded 
them but in others it has fallen behind. Consistent with past studies (Mody & Tsui, 1995; Straubhaar 
et al., 1995;  Petrazzini & Clark, 1996) this review shows that liberalization, and more importantly 
competition, resulted in significant increases in availability and accessibility of telecommunication 
services diversifying access points and increasing options. Regardless of the approach embraced by 
telecommunication administrators, liberalization has served the goals of accelerating overall basic 
service penetration. However, countries are facing problems in maintaining or increasing network 
access at the same pace after the first phase of reform, typically about four years after competition is 
introduced. After the fifth year of liberalization, network growth levels off resulting in a plateau in 
household and payphone penetration. This trend is present regardless of the USO strategy embraced 
by the country. Curiously, countries with no USO (Chile) or with flexible USO (Argentina) exhibit a 
better performance of household penetration (Graph 1). 
 
VENEZUELA
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Fixed phone connection/ income per capita 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.4 0.8 2.0 1.9 2.4
Mobile phone connection/ income per capita 0.3
Res. mon. phone subc./ monthly per capita income 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.1 2.4 2.1 2.4
Res. mon. mobile subc./ monthly per capita income 16.1 18.9 15.6 9.2 9.9
 Universal Service 23 
Graph 1.  Availability - Household telephone penetration (Phones/ 100 households) 
 In spite of the evidence, developing countries have bet more on privatization than on 
competition when coming to redefine their supply strategies. In their attempt to make the sale more 
attractive to buyers, less developed nations have awarded monopoly conditions to private operators 
while reducing regulatory oversight. Later, in the transition from monopoly conditions to market 
structures, administrators find themselves lacking the tools to align telecommunication policies with 
social and economic needs (Melody, 1999). 
 The main achievement of managed liberalization schemes, those that imposed USO on private 
monopolies (Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela), seems to be related to stronger rates of public 
telephone penetration (Graph 2). It may indicate a higher commitment for assuring service 
accessibility and meeting social goals. However, some of these cases also present a common problem: 
Mexico and Venezuela renegotiated and restated USO by lowering caps for expansion of the overall 
network, while focusing on plans of public telephony. One of the major obstacles to evaluating the 
real benefits of this strategy is the lack of data on rural versus urban penetration. Plans to expand 
private or public telephony as expressed in licenses, contracts and bylaws did not relate service 
targets to specific populations (low-income groups, disabled people). Operators do not report data on 
penetration in rural areas either to ITU databases or to CITEL records, limiting their plans for rural 
areas to public telephony.  
 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Argentina Brazil
Chile Mexico
Peru Venezuela
66.2% Chile
61% Argentina
46% Venezuela
35% Mexico
28% Peru
Source: ITU
30% Brazil
 Universal Service 24 
Graph 2. Accessibility - Payphones per 1,000 inhabitants 
 
 In trying to balance the contradictory interests of operators and the public, administrators have 
had to agree on more conservative scenarios for network expansion. The situation could certainly 
point out a tendency to wrongly estimate the parameters set forth in reform scenarios. It could also be 
evidence of the lack of an assertive administration in a more deregulated environment. In either case, 
it represents the need for flexible regulatory mechanisms that target specific groups in greater need.  
 Saturation of demand cannot be argued as a reason for the deceleration of growth.  In countries 
with overall telephone penetration between 61% and 10.4%, universal service is still a pending goal. 
One reason for this could be a failure to deal effectively with issues of affordability and tariffs as the 
network progresses from one stage of development to another. Tariff rebalancing has reduced 
connection charges while driving monthly charge up (Graph 3). Venezuela, in particular, has been 
affected by increasing telephone charges, a factor that may explain the migration of users to mobile 
telephone services. In countries with severe problems of income distribution, and that have 
continuously faced economic difficulties, there is still a tremendous need for more socially desirable 
pricing schemes.  
 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Arg en tin a B razil
C h ile Mexico
P eru Ven ezu ela
0.9 Chile
3 Argentina
3.2 Venezuela
3.3 Mexico
1.9 Peru
Source: ITU
3 Brazil
 Universal Service 25 
Graph 3. Affordability -Tariff and income 
Source: ITU Start database 
 Experience with the massive use by mobile service providers of pre-paid plans as part of their 
marketing strategies shows the advantages and strong potential response to repressed demand. Fixed 
telephone providers in Peru (1998) and Venezuela (2000) have implemented similar plans 
discovering that low-income groups have more purchasing power than expected. The alternative 
emerged as a marketing strategy of the incumbents to cope with the competitive pressures of mobile 
telephone operators, but regulators remain inactive about this important issue. 
 The virtual stoppage in fixed-line network expansion should be directly related to the tremendous 
growth in mobile cellular services. In theory, mobile telephony should enhance the options for 
increasing service availability and accessibility. But in the case of some of these nations, cellular 
phones may not just become a supplement to a fixed phone but a substitute for it.  
 Although the ITU considers this scenario as a favorable one, from the industry point of view, the 
period of exclusivity represented higher economic pressures for the expansion of fixed-line networks. 
The majority of the reforms have set free cellular markets while keeping monopolies for basic services, 
as a way to assure to fixed phone operators revenues that guarantee profitability and network expansion.  
However, in countries with low telephone penetration and a high demand for service, monopolies 
moved slower than mobile cellular services in responding to demand.  
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 Mobile cellular altered the equation by becoming a shortcut to meet people’s needs. In countries 
with higher fixed-phone penetration, cellular operators seek subscribers more aggressively, offering 
lower prices, hence making the service more accessible to people. However, in countries with low 
telephone penetration the high demand is usually translated into higher prices for mobile services, 
setting them off as the preserve of higher income groups. In these nations the cellular market captures a 
highly profitable segment of the population. However, options of access are not enhanced for lower 
income groups. 
 The relevant indicator to observe the phenomenon is not teledensity, but substitution rates –the ratio 
of mobile cellular subscribers to total telephone subscribers, which indicates “the degree to which 
mobile cellular is used as an alternative rather than a supplement to fixed-line networks” (ITU, 1998b, 
p.49). A high ratio suggests that many cellular subscribers have no alternative for telephone service. 
Substitution rates are higher in Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela, that is countries with lower per capita 
income, whose fixed telephony had lower penetration rates at the moment of introduction of mobile 
services (see Graph 4).  
Graph 4.- Fixed/ Cellular Substitution 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Venezuela is a good example of the trend being examined here. Since 1998 the number of 
subscribers to cellular phone services has exceeded subscribers of fixed telephones. Teledensity 
statistics register a negative growth of –4% , but the combined indicator of telephone penetration 
increased 21%. What type of challenge then does this phenomenon pose to regulators? 
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The need for a redistribution of resources in freer markets has led to a second round of 
legislative reforms. The first generation of USO, highly focused on general target of service 
accessibility, is being replaced by a second generation of USO. Chile (1994), Peru (1995), Mexico 
(1997), and more recently Argentina (1999), Brazil (2000) and Venezuela (2000) have started to 
explore this path through new legislation and the creation of Universal Service Funds. The 
establishment of public funds with contributions from competiting telecommunication providers is a 
starting point to solve the Gordian knot of financing the incorporation of citizens deprived from the 
service. However, it is important to move beyond the supply-side discussion to consider the demand-
side of who is effectively receiving the service and what means are more appropriate to enforce USO. 
The Mexican and Venezuelan cases suggest that more attention should be paid to alternatives that 
increase individual access, in particular taking advantage of the rapid growth of mobile cellular 
networks. Community solutions, such as telecenters, have also not been completely developed in 
governmental policy. With the exception of Peru and Chile, no other analyzed countries implemented 
public policies to bring communities into the effort of enhancing access. Venezuela and Brazil have 
recently launched national policies on public Internet access through telecenters. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 Mosco remind us that telecommunication reforms redefine the role of the state as settler of 
social claims. Drawing on political and social theory, he identifies four modes of state intervention 
relevant to telecommunication. They are representation, expertise, social control and market control. 
‘Representation’ marks the degree of incorporation of the social in the decision making process from 
the point of view of a more deliberative formulation of regulations. 'Expertise' suggests an extremely 
narrowed procedure in regulation formulation carried out by boards of experts. ‘Social control’ and 
‘market control’ are set off by the degree of direct or indirect control exerted upon the operations not 
only by the state but also by labor unions, other business sectors, and the public. Social control relies 
on corporatism while market control sees competition as the major form of governance. Based on this 
model, this study tries to identify shifts of modes of governance brought about by telecommunication 
reforms in five Latin American countries.  
 The shift from state corporatism to market competition models in the six studied countries has 
not gone beyond the 'expertise' form of governance outlined by Mosco (1988), in which the power of 
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newly created regulatory agencies remains captive to technical debates that represent the interest of a 
narrow group of providers with little concern for social claims. In this context, the 'hybrid' regulatory 
system of the transitions has hampered USO in countries that try to apply strict rules to monopolies of 
basic services, and a set of more flexible commitments to substitute services, such as mobile cellular, 
that operate in competition. The virtual failure of USO policies in Venezuela and Mexico should be 
interpreted in light of these contradictions.  
 Mansell and Wehn’s (1998) international assessment of the progress of the information society 
suggests that in the deployment of ‘the network of networks' that substitutes for the homogeneous 
network of PTTs, developing countries should combine three major strategies: (1) the increase of 
competitive pressures, (2) the use of all technologies available in the market for enhancing means of 
interconnection, and (3) the enforcement of USO.  These authors argue that in this process led by 
technological convergence, regulation is “necessary to provide a foundation upon which markets can 
function more effectively than they could otherwise” (p.16). The multi-network perspective should be 
enhanced through a multi-leveled approach, a set of moving targets addressing the needs of access at 
the public, institutional and individual level (Hudson, 2000). All these elements demand a better and 
more active regulator, one capable of articulating innovative USO targeting users with special needs. 
 An alternative to moving away from the expertise model towards the path of market control is 
more and more effective competition in a diversified market. Multiplicity of providers increases the 
negotiation power of the regulator as settler of social claims. A good example of the step that should 
be taken in this direction is the strategy displayed by the Chilean and Brazilian authorities in dividing 
up the market and introducing competition along with privatization.  
 Once the network increases its points of access through different services, policy makers should 
take advantage of the reconfiguration fostered by competitive markets to meet social goals. 
Regulators need to develop a single definition of universal service that extends social commitments to 
all operators of the telecommunication market. This definition should cut across services without 
being bundled into technological specificity. It ought to incorporate factors from the consumer-
demand perspective accounting for the urban-rural continuum, and social and economic strata. Peru, 
Chile, Argentina and Venezuela have adopted steps in this direction. But it is not yet clear how this 
new conceptualization of basic telecommunication service will get enacted through concrete plans. 
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Technological convergence is reshaping the market. Regulation is key to set in motion the 
process that uses the sum total of capabilities available in the market to meet the needs of specific 
segments of the population still deprived from telecommunication services. As Melody (1999) has 
argued, universal service regulations can provide an answer that bridges divergent interests and 
captures network externality benefits that competitive markets cannot achieve. This is possible 
through the incorporation of “unphoned” users who still may have resources to pay for the basic 
service, thus enhancing network externalities. However, this would demand a market-regulated 
system that attends to a wider range of social claims than is currently the case, by setting fair rules for 
all participants in the market, including consumers and newcomers. 
 
ENDNOTES 
i The majority of the shares in Telecom Argentina belonged to a joint venture between France Telecom and STET from Italy 
while Telefónica from Spain controlled Telefónica Argentina. Foreign private investors bought 60% of company shares 
while the remaining 40% were sold to employees (10%) and the public (30%). Imprecise regulations and delays in the 
organization of the regulatory agency triggered severe criticism of the process and led to the renegotiation of the concessions 
for both companies a year after the privatization took place. Therefore, it is considered that the reform was not fully in place 
until 1991 (Francés, 1993). 
 
ii In its early years of development the Chilean national network consisted of several small local service providers 
interconnected through the Compañía de Teléfonos de Chile (CTC), owned by the ITT. In 1964 the state stepped into the 
business opening the Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL-Chile), which coexisted with CTC as a second 
player in the market. In 1971, during the government of Salvador Allende, CTC was taken over by the government, which 
attempted to consolidate all companies into a public holding. However, after the 1973 coup, the military government 
launched a program of liberalization in the industry that allowed the resale of telephone lines and competition in terminal 
equipment. In 1982 the state began to sell its share in small local companies. And in 1986, it made public offers of its shares 
in CTC and ENTEL, with Telefónica of Spain emerging as the largest buyer. The changes were accompanied with a reform 
of the telecom law that freed tariffs in those areas of the country where market conditions were sufficient.   
 
iii TELMEX was developed as a private monopoly until 1971, when the Mexican government bought the majority of the 
stock owned by ITT and Ericsson. Keeping a minor participation of national private investors, the company grew as a public 
corporation with subsidiaries in the most diverse businesses (satellite and telegraph, real estate, advertising, and 
construction) (Francés, 1993). However, a growing technological gap and the deviation of funds to subsidiaries hindered 
network expansion, and by the end of the 1980s, the underdevelopment of the basic network had become a stumbling block 
for plans of economic modernization. The government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari justified the privatization of TELMEX 
as a solution to major bottlenecks in the provision of telecommunication services. 
 
iv The strategy originally set a step-by-step liberalization of the market through the separation of operative and regulatory 
functions, the corporatization of CANTV, and the liberalization of mobile cellular markets and value-added services. 
However, the need for multilateral funds to keep macroeconomic balance, and the lack of sources to pay back the 
considerable foreign debt of the company meant the corporatization strategy was turned into a plan for full privatization in 
1990. 
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